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Pioneering firms have the potential to achieve 
significant social and economic benefits in fragile and 
conflict‑affected settings. However, these contexts 
involve higher risks and costs, which dissuades pioneers 
and investors. We argue that the public good these firms 
provide warrants the use of public funds to offset the 
costs of pioneering in these settings. 
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Executive summary
Globally, the last few decades have seen significant progress in poverty reduction – but fragile 
and conflict-affected settings have been more difficult to reach, resulting in a growing portion 
of the world’s poor living in these environments. Today, some 76.5% of those living in extreme 
poverty are located in fragile states, countries where almost one-quarter of the world’s 
population live (OECD 2020).
Job creation and private sector 
growth are key requirements for 
poverty reduction and socio‑economic 
development and, alongside necessary 
gains in social and political stability, 
are needed to create the conditions for 
countries to move out of fragility. 
However, weaknesses in local 
economic conditions and legacies of 
poor governance, such as inadequate 
infrastructure or unpredictable 
regulatory frameworks, impose major 
barriers to private sector growth 
in fragile contexts. Investment 
opportunities are extremely limited 
and firms operating in these 
settings face considerable risks and 
disproportionately high costs. 
To overcome the low‑development, 
low‑financing equilibria of these 
economies and to kickstart structural 
transformation, pioneering 
investments are needed. Pioneering 
firms are market movers and creators: 
they venture new markets, initiate 
new products and processes, and 
generate spillovers that reduce the 
costs and risks that subsequent market 
entrants face. A small number of 
investments may even have catalytic 
potential, enabling direct and indirect 
multipliers that ripple through the entire 
economy – igniting knowledge transfer, 
capacity building, reducing the price of 
intermediate inputs, and establishing 
forward and backward linkages. 
However, first movers face high 
pioneering costs: overhead and 
start‑up costs, such as costs 
associated with establishing necessary 
infrastructure or utility connections, 
paying for security, and navigating 
unclear or incomplete laws and 
regulations. They frequently have to 
provide support to governments to 
strengthen the regulatory framework 
governing the sector of investment. 
With the smaller ticket sizes that are 
possible in fragile settings, these 
disproportionately high costs easily 
sink otherwise viable projects and 
there is a high failure rate of early‑
stage firms in these settings. This 
first mover disadvantage leads to 
persistent underinvestment in fragile 
contexts. 
Pioneering firms cannot do it alone 
in fragile contexts – nor should they 
be expected to. Their contribution to 
strengthening enabling environments, 
establishing and developing 
new markets, creating jobs and 
income‑generating opportunities, 
and catalysing private sector 
development in some of the world’s 
most challenging environments is a 
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public good that warrants the use 
of public funding to offset the unique 
costs of pioneering in these settings.  
Past approaches to private sector 
development in fragile states have not 
yielded significant progress to date, 
necessitating that development finance 
actors come together to collaboratively 
develop, test, and improve financing 
mechanisms that work to support 
pioneering firms in these difficult 
environments. Without compensation 
and reward mechanisms that account 
for the significant social and economic 
benefits and broader public goods that 
pioneers generate, these firms have 
few incentives to break new ground. 
A financial niche exists for 
development finance in these 
contexts. Unlike traditional commercial 
lenders, development finance can 
often pool together large financing 
players and operate under an explicit 
development mandate, including to 
target private sector development in 
low‑income and fragile environments. 
Development finance is also more 
tolerant to higher risks and can 
provide capital to firms on terms more 
favourable than commercial loans. 
Development finance institutions 
(DFI) have a particularly important 
role to play in this work, leveraging 
their capacity to use public funding 
to de‑risk investments, their ability to 
coordinate efforts across development 
finance actors, and their deep 
expertise, networks, and influence to 
mobilise collaborative approaches to 
both upstream work and project co‑
investment. The dearth of large firms in 
which to invest in fragile contexts also 
raises the question of a potential DFI 
role in helping to establish and grow 
local formal firms in these settings. 
Not all DFIs are set up to take on these 
roles and some adjustments in the 
way DFIs operate will be necessary 
for them to be fit for purpose for the 
critical role they could play in fragile 
settings. 
Working with governments of 
fragile states, as well as with non-
governmental organisations and 
civil society in these countries, is 
vital to ensure that projects have 
buy‑in from government and that local 
entities can provide the oversight and 
guidance needed to guard against 
the potentially negative impacts 
that business activities and private 
sector development may have in 
fragile, conflict‑affected, and post‑
conflict settings. Additionally, careful 
regulation, context‑specific strategies, 
and comprehensive approaches to 
conflict sensitivity are needed to 
ensure that private sector development 
can be a force for good. 
Investing in local intermediaries – 
local banks for debt and venture 
capital funds for equity – and 
helping establish and strengthen the 
capabilities of these intermediaries is 
needed if DFI funding is to reach the 
numerous small and medium‑sized 
enterprises (SMEs) operating in fragile 
contexts. Finally, there are a number 
of innovative financing tools that 
development finance actors can tailor 
for the realities of fragile settings, 
test, iterate, and scale up to achieve 
greater reach. 
Job creation and private sector 
development have the potential 
to generate significant social and 
economic benefits in fragile and 
conflict‑affected settings. If harnessed 
effectively as a force for peace and 
stability, catalysing private sector 
development in fragile contexts can be 
an invaluable public good that helps to 
stabilise fragile settings and improve 
the lives of the many millions of people 
who live in these places. 
4 — STATE FRAGILITY INITIATIVE
1 Introduction
Despite steady gains in global poverty reduction over the last few decades, there is a 
growing portion of the world’s poor living in fragile and conflict-affected situations. 
Some 76.5% of those living in extreme poverty are located in fragile states, countries 
where almost one-quarter of the world’s population live.1
Fragile environments differ considerably from one another, but tend to share some 
common features, including “the lack of basic security, inadequate government 
capacity, the absence of a properly functioning private sector, and the presence of 
divided societies.”2 These common symptoms are, however, the result of varying 
underlying drivers and historical factors that necessitate different policy responses. 
Without active support from the public and private sectors, fragile settings are likely 
to remain stuck in consistent cycles of poverty and under-development.  
Breaking out of fragility requires reaching a political settlement that can support 
social cohesion and state building. Attaining a degree of political stability is an 
essential foundation for economic activity which, in turn, has the potential to create 
conditions conducive to supporting peace and escaping fragility.  
For much of the developed world, the long-term transition toward prosperity has 
been rooted in structural transformation of the economy – the process by which 
production shifts from low- to higher-productivity activities both within and across 
sectors.3 As a modern private sector develops, a number of opportunities emerge 
over time. This includes higher-quality jobs, which alleviates poverty; increased tax 
revenues, which strengthens state capacity; and expansion into larger markets, which 
drives increases in firm productivity and growth.
A key obstacle for fragile contexts, however, is that weaknesses in local economic 
conditions and legacies of poor governance, such as inadequate infrastructure 
or unpredictable regulatory frameworks, impose major barriers to private 
sector growth. In addition, access to finance, which could help overcome some 
of these barriers, is typically constrained, preventing firms from realising their 
potential. Escaping this low-development, low-financing trap requires pioneering 
investments, which play a key role in kickstarting the process of structural change. 
Pioneering investments are market movers and creators: they initiate new products 
and processes that can be replicated and scaled, generate spillovers which may 
offer wider public goods for society, and reduce the costs and risks associated with 
subsequent investments. Pioneering investments are often made by multinationals, 
which may be better placed to overcome some of the distortions of fragile contexts 
by bringing with them production knowledge, connections to foreign markets, and 
deeper capital resources.4
Firms entering fragile contexts face disproportionately high pioneering costs: 
overhead and start-up costs associated with establishing necessary infrastructure or 
utility connections, paying for security, and navigating laws and regulations. 
1 OECD 2020.
2 Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018, p. 4.
3 Rosenstein‑Rodan 1943, Nurkse 1953, Lewis 1954, Rostow 1960.
4 Jones 2011.
76.5% 
Of those living in 
extreme poverty across 
the world, 76.5% are 
located in fragile states, 
countries where almost 
one-quarter of the 
world’s population live
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They must also navigate the deals that shape firms’ policy treatment in contexts where 
variability in policy implementation is common.5 Additionally, projects in fragile 
contexts tend to be relatively small. As such, high overheads and start-up costs can 
represent such a large portion of investment costs that they sink otherwise viable 
projects. High uncertainty in these settings, due to political and economic instability 
or a lack of information on comparable firms’ experiences, also concerns investors, 
whose ambiguity aversion contributes to underinvestment in these settings. 
Developing serious investment opportunities in fragile settings is a complex task which 
requires time, resources, and deep local knowledge. Given poor starting conditions, 
reform efforts need to be envisioned as a process of facilitating market creation before 
one of market development. Basic enabling factors must be strengthened to attract 
and support formal firms, such as improved regulatory frameworks, a skilled labour 
force, and enforcement of quality standards. These improvements could reduce the 
overall risks for both pioneers and subsequent market entrants. 
But this is not an easy task. It involves fixing a number of weak links in the 
markets of fragile countries and all links may need to be fixed for the chain to be 
strengthened.6 Addressing these weak links is nonetheless vital and could have 
transformative impact on economies. 
Private sector development and job creation in fragile contexts is frequently 
considered to be a public good, a key element in achieving and maintaining peace 
and, as such, the use of public resources for this purpose can be easily justified. 
However, the positive impacts of private sector development are not a given. In 
fragile and conflict-affected settings, private sector activities just as often have 
negative impacts by contributing to the continuation of conflict, such as through 
firms that benefit from and perpetuate the conflict economy or job creation that 
entrenches ethnic or regional inequalities.7 Where the distribution of benefits from 
economic growth remain skewed and contested, additional resources will fuel, 
rather than bridge, societal divides.8
These risks necessitate that private sector development interventions in fragile, 
conflict-affected, and post-conflict contexts be approached with considerable nuance 
and context-specific strategies.9 Regulation of the private sector to guard against 
deepening tensions, monitoring the distribution of benefits from private sector 
development, and engaging with civil society to remain informed of changing social 
and political dynamics are all critical. 
Undoubtedly, financing private sector growth in these settings is not straightforward 
and requires leveraging finance across both the public and private sectors. Many 
donors have already adopted blended finance models and large private investors are 
paying greater attention to impact-led approaches. Addressing the challenges of firm 
growth in fragile contexts will need collaboration, innovation, and shared purpose 
across multiple players, with development finance institutions (DFIs) potentially 
playing a particularly important coordination role.
5 Pritchett & Hallward‑Driemeier 2010.
6 Jones 2011.
7 Mayer et al. 2020, Venugopal 2012.
8 Ganson & M’cleod 2018.
9 Mayer et al 2020.
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2 Structural change and escaping 
fragility
2.1 Structural change, productivity, and development
Escaping fragility requires gains in both political and economic stability. On 
the economic side, increased firm growth and productivity is needed for fragile 
environments to become more stable, prosperous, and liveable. Structural 
transformation across sectors, even more so than within sectors, has driven some 
of the most impressive escapes from poverty in history.10
Structural change is the process by which factors of production – land, labour, and 
capital – shift from lower to higher productivity activities. In contexts of early-
stage development, this is typically seen by countries shifting from rural agriculture 
and informal services towards growth driven by industrial and knowledge sectors 
in cities.11 In China, for example, the transition from poverty to rapid social and 
economic progress after the late 1970s was largely driven by reforms that shifted 
labour from subsistence farming into urban manufacturing.12
As economies undergo structural change, large and specialised formal firms are able to 
develop and, in turn, generate outcomes that have the potential to support stability:
 — Productive jobs – Underemployment and unproductive jobs are replaced 
with more productive, higher-wage opportunities in the formal private 
sector. As household incomes increase, so do their investments in productive 
assets such as health, nutrition, and education. Job creation also increases 
the opportunity cost of conflict and, hence, strengthens incentives for social 
cohesion and stability.13
 — Supporting infrastructure – Private investments to support industry growth 
have spillover effects on the wider economy. These include the development of 
critical infrastructure – such as roads, power generators, and equipment – as 
well as ancillary institutions and services, including finance, insurance, and 
legal services. 
 — Exports – Excluding natural resources, fragile contexts tend to have a very 
limited export base, which severely constrains firm growth and foreign 
exchange earnings. Exporting connects the private sector with larger external 
markets, providing an important source of firm-level growth, productivity 
increases, job creation, knowledge generation, and product upgrading. 
 — Public revenue – More formal firms and increased revenue from exports 
broadens the tax base and provides a critical source of tax revenue for 
otherwise resource-constrained governments. This strengthens governments’ 
ability to deliver public goods and services, including investing in 
performance–enhancing infrastructure with the potential to ignite further 
private sector development.
10 McMillan & Rodrik 2013.
11 Lewis 1954, Caselli 2005, Kuznets 1966, Herrendorf et al. 2014.
12 Kriticos & Henderson 2019.
13 Collier et al, 2019, IFC 2019.
7 — STRENGTHENING DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS
While these outcomes are attainable, they do not happen automatically. First, active 
public policy is needed to create an enabling environment in which the private sector 
can thrive.14 Investments in land and infrastructure are particularly important for 
formal firms to gain the scale and specialisation efficiencies of cities, for instance.15 
Similarly, institutional investments that enhance the rule of law, for example, are 
necessary to reduce the risk of expropriation and safeguard large-scale investments.
Second, while these public policies are critical for creating an enabling environment 
for private sector development, the process of structural change itself is largely 
private sector-driven.16 Private firms tend to have the competitive incentives needed 
to progressively improve efficiencies and productivity, thereby creating more higher 
productivity jobs. However, in some instances, such as in Rwanda, the state has 
demonstrated an important role in furthering structural change through harnessing 
the rents of early capital development for deployment in longer-term development.17
Third, in fragile and post-conflict settings, whether these outcomes result in social 
cohesion and stability depends centrally on how benefits are distributed within 
the population. In these contexts, job creation frequently favours some groups over 
others, giving rise to ethnic and regional inequalities that are conflict-inducing.18  
How governments use tax revenue collected from the private sector is also critical – if 
revenues are not used to fund inclusive public services, tensions can be aggravated. 
The process of structural transformation that produced the socio-economic progress 
of the last two centuries has been highly global. China and other countries in South 
East Asia have thrived by entering global export markets and capitalising on wide 
wage gaps in the manufacturing sector, making them more competitive than high-
income countries. The same process, however, has been rarer in fragile settings. In 
large part, this is due to fragile countries being at earlier stages of state and nation 
building, less economically developed, and less integrated into the global economy.  
Without productivity growth and structural change, many fragile contexts have 
become stuck in low development equilibria with stagnating or falling growth rates. 
Not only have fragile settings fallen behind, but their divergence from the rest of 
the world is growing – due to capital flight and low rates of private investment, for 
example – making it more difficult for them to be internationally competitive and to 
enter saturated export markets.19
14 Noman & Stiglitz 2015.
15 Collier 2016. It should be noted, however, that investments in land and 
infrastructure are the riskiest investments to make in fragile contexts, given their 
immoveable nature, with investments in firms with fewer assets or more mobile assets 
being preferred in fragile settings.
16 Noman & Stiglitz 2015.
17 Booth & Golooba‑Mutebi 2011.
18 Venugopal 2012.
19 Collier 2007.
Photo credit: Jonathan Ernst/World Bank
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“In contexts of 
fragility, pioneering 
firms are a critical 
element in economic 
transformation.”
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2.2 Pioneering investments and structural change
Pivotal change is difficult to achieve in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The 
average firm in fragile contexts is small in size and local in scope. The informal 
economy accounts for roughly 86% of employment in Africa (72% if agriculture 
is excluded).20 In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the average firm consists of just one 
person, reflecting the difficulties of growing a business in challenging environments. 
Breaking out of this low-productivity equilibrium requires a transformative shock, 
such as that offered by pioneering investments, particularly those with strong 
catalytic potential.21
Pioneers’ operations aim at commercialising new products and processes and 
venturing previously under-explored markets, engaging in a process of market 
creation and expansion.22 Pioneering firms vary in age, sector, and origin, but tend 
to be larger, have additional experience, rely less on fixed assets, and are able to 
innovate at smaller sizes.23 Given the scarcity of foreign firms in fragile settings, the 
majority of pioneering firms in these contexts are domestic (although, where they 
do exist, foreign firms are significantly more likely to pioneer relative to domestic 
firms).24 Firms from other countries in the region may enjoy a special advantage due 
to their contextual knowledge and pre-established linkages with regional markets.
In contexts of fragility, pioneering firms are a critical element in economic 
transformation: by supporting improvements in the business environment and 
facilitating greater market knowledge, they enable more firms to enter the market while 
also supporting existing firms through backward and forward linkages. They have the 
potential to act as development catalysts for entire markets by reducing entry barriers.
Key benefits of pioneering firms include:
 — Knowledge production – With limited information, investors are unable to 
adequately evaluate and quantify the potential risks and rewards of investing 
in fragile contexts, and ambiguity aversion means their default choice is often 
not to invest. Pioneering firms, however, generate information about the 
markets they enter, which provides information that was previously either 
missing or unreliable, thereby reducing uncertainty.
 — Investment spillovers – Pioneers make essential investments which lead to 
direct and indirect productivity gains for existing firms in the country, as well 
as for successive firms entering that market. These include investments such 
as training labour, establishing consumer markets and supply chains, and 
supporting public authorities to develop legal and regulatory frameworks. Once 
undertaken, these investments reduce overhead and start-up costs for successive 
market entrants who can leverage gains from actions taken by pioneers.
20 ILO 2018.
21 Collier et al 2019.
22 IFC 2019.
23 Collier et al 2019.
24 Ibid.
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2.3 The economic case for supporting pioneers
While pioneers serve the public good, their pioneering involves taking on notable risk 
and costs. The cost of upstream activities needed to make projects possible places a 
disproportionately high burden on individual pioneering investments, sinking otherwise 
viable projects. Moreover, the stakes are unfavourable for pioneers: if a project fails, they 
are often left with no more than a financial loss, despite making valuable contributions 
that are often beneficial to the wider market. If the pioneer succeeds, successive market 
entrants will be attracted by the opportunities that the pioneer has uncovered and are 
able to enter the market without having to bear the same risks and costs. Either way, the 
pioneering firm is disadvantaged, and these disadvantages generally outweigh the benefits 
offered by low or no competition in the short run.
This first-mover disadvantage leads to persistent underinvestment in fragile contexts. 
Without compensation and reward mechanisms that account for the significant social 
and economic benefits and broader public goods that pioneers generate by supporting 
the creation of new markets, firms will have few incentives to break new ground.
An illustrative case is that of Southern Sudan Beverages Ltd, a pioneering investment 
in South Sudan (see Box 1). The market failure that the first-mover disadvantage raises 
motivates the need for supportive investments that offset the additional costs that 
pioneers incur and reward them for undertaking activities that have a positive impact on 
the wider economic environment.
Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of pioneering in a fragile setting
First-mover advantages
‑ Priority access to natural resources, land, and labour
‑ Limited initial competition
‑ Provision of missing service and possibility to capture large demand
‑ Potential for brand recognition and customer loyalty that persists after subsequent 
entrants reach the market
‑ Access to government authorities and stronger negotiating power
First-mover disadvantages
‑ Poor knowledge about local market conditions
‑ Necessary trial and error phase
‑ High (often unobservable) start‑up costs, such as navigating the regulatory environment, 
training labour, establishing and training suppliers, developing infrastructure, etc.
‑ Inertia of local firms
‑ Shifts in demand, supply, and regulatory requirements
‑ Risk of failure due to unprofitability, conflict, change in political leadership, etc., with 
little or no cost recovery options
‑ Free‑riding and imitation from subsequent market entrants
Socio-economic benefits to society
‑ Labour training and capacity building
‑ Provision of missing goods and services
‑ Investment in public infrastructure
‑ Regulatory framework development
‑ Job creation
‑ Knowledge production, contributing to lower perceived risk
‑ Stimulus to domestic firm ecosystem through the establishment of backward and 
forward linkages with suppliers and distributors
‑ Signalling effect and attraction of subsequent market entrants, which sustains and 
scales socio‑economic effects
11 — STRENGTHENING DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS
Box 1: Southern Sudan Beverages Ltd and the challenges of pioneering in 
fragile settings25
Following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Southern 
Sudan was granted six years of autonomy from the Sudanese government leading 
up to the 2011 referendum, which culminated in South Sudan’s independence. Taking 
advantage of the fact that the region was no longer governed by Sudan’s Islamic law, 
which prohibited production and sale of alcohol, SABMiller, a South African brewery 
and beverage multinational, established a subsidiary, Southern Sudan Beverages Ltd 
(SSBL), in Juba in 2009. It was country’s the first multinational manufacturer.
The high‑risk investment decision was motivated by the opportunity for SSBL to 
capture a large and unserved local demand, primarily for alcoholic beverages, before 
competitors entered the market. SABMiller already had investments in several other 
challenging contexts in sub‑Saharan Africa and was optimistic that the success of 
a similar venture in neighbouring Uganda could be replicated. Southern Sudan’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs was supportive of the investment, which SABMiller 
hoped would be a positive signalling effect for other firms and would encourage 
development of the local non‑oil economy.
The investment realised notable positive social and economic impacts, employing 
over 400 Southern Sudanese nationals, establishing a network of 50,000 retailers, 
and generating US$ 1 million in tax receipts. SSBL became the largest employer and 
tax contributor outside of the oil sector. However, the company also faced severe 
challenges, including:  
• Lack of financing: Due to the underdeveloped banking sector, SSBL could not 
obtain any financial support domestically. It relied on credit from the IFC and 
SABMiller, its parent company, which became its only lender from 2015 onwards.
• Lack of domestic inputs: Weak local agricultural and industrial development 
forced SSBL to source most of its inputs from foreign markets, limiting its ability 
to foster local partnerships and raising its input costs. There were also no 
incentives in place to use local inputs, which were notably more expensive.
• High costs: Transport costs were twice as high as the regional average due 
to the lack of paved roads, and the limited electricity network forced SSBL to 
rely on costly diesel generators for electricity generation. Corruption, coupled 
with an ineffective judicial system, further raised costs and lowered the firm’s 
profitability. SSBL’s operational costs were one‑third higher than SABMiller’s 
comparable investment in Uganda. 
• Macroeconomic challenges: In 2015, high government spending fuelled a 
growing budget deficit. Authorities responded by printing money, which led to 
soaring inflation and currency depreciation. Foreign currency, needed to finance 
SSBL’s imported inputs, became increasingly difficult to source.
In early 2016, SSBL announced its decision to close operations in South Sudan, 
identifying the shortage of foreign currency as a critical factor in the closure decision.
25 Morjaria & Haas 2017, Manson 2015, Jones 2015, Kuo 2016, Jones 2016.
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3 Supporting pioneering investments 
through development finance
The social and economic benefits that pioneers can potentially generate in fragile 
contexts are significant, but the defining characteristics of these settings dissuade 
conventional providers of finance for the private sector. The public good nature of 
private sector development does, however, make a strong case for intervention in the 
form of financial support that compensates pioneers for incurring the risks and costs 
associated with entering and operating in challenging environments.
The financial capacity of national governments is often too low to support 
subsidising private sector investments, due to a combination of weak domestic revenue 
mobilisation, high debt repayment burdens, limited ability to raise international credit, 
and issues of corruption and abuse of power. In addition, instability and political crises 
limit governments’ abilities to sustain long-term investment strategies.
Traditional commercial lenders, such as banks, private equity firms, and pension 
funds, tend to have specific return expectations, time horizons, and risk appetites that 
can rarely be met by the investments possible in fragile settings. This limits commercial 
lending in these contexts. Additionally, their traditional skill sets – based in modelling, 
valuation, selection, and structuring – falls short of the know-how needed to invest in 
fragile environments, where conflict sensitivity and the technical expertise needed to 
support governments to develop legal and regulatory frameworks are also needed.
This leaves a ‘financial niche’ for development finance actors, which include 
multilateral development banks (MDBs), DFIs, bilateral lenders, and philanthropic 
organisations. Unlike traditional commercial lenders, development financing can 
often pool together large financing players and operate under an explicit development 
mandate, including to specifically target private sector development in low-income and 
fragile environments. Development finance is also more able to tolerate higher risks and 
to provide capital to private firms on terms more favourable than commercial loans.
Table 2: Investment requirements in fragile contexts
Characteristic State Commercial institutions
Development 
finance
Financial resources x  
Patient and/or risk‑taking capital x x 
Development mandate  x 
Decision‑making without 
political influence
x x /  
3.1 The current state of development finance in fragile 
settings
Traditionally, the development finance space was dominated by bilateral and 
multilateral aid, which was primarily funnelled to the public sector in areas of 
capacity building, regulatory reform, macroeconomic management, and humanitarian 
assistance. The financing requirements of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
estimated in trillions of US dollars, have made clear that overseas development 
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assistance (ODA) alone cannot achieve such a vision. New sources of financing need 
to be mobilised to scale up investment from billions to trillions. 
Development finance has undergone a significant transformation in developing 
countries, with a rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and growth in DFI 
finance, alongside comparative stagnation or reduction of ODA. However, the 
situation in fragile settings is very different:
 — ODA has increased by 26% in real terms between 2009 and 2016 in fragile 
contexts, which receive nearly two-thirds of global funds. ODA is, and will 
continue to be, a critical source of financing for governments in conflict and 
fragile settings, rivalled only by remittances in terms of size, and 2.3 times 
greater than the value of FDI inflows into these settings.26 Not all ODA is 
intended for longer-term development purposes – some 25% is allocated for 
humanitarian needs.27
 — FDI inflows into fragile states have been increasing steadily over the last two 
decades. However, they still represent a small drop (about 1%) of global 
FDI flows, are primarily captured by a few middle-income and resource-rich 
countries, and trends in investment and disinvestment vary significantly with 
context.28 FDI as a share of GDP in fragile countries is three times higher in 
resource-rich countries than in non-resource-rich fragile states.29
 — DFIs, both private sector windows of MDBs and bilateral investment 
agencies, have experienced significant growth in their portfolios since 
the 2000s. Nonetheless, their track record in fragile contexts has received 
criticism: they have been accused of adopting risk-averse investment strategies 
and transactional approaches to investment deals, prioritising financial 
returns over development impact, and making limited proactive efforts to 
seek out new opportunities.30 These dynamics have led DFI investment to 
focus on upper-middle income markets and safer sectors, as well as frequently 
favouring debt over equity, potentially limiting investment additionality.31
The above highlights the need to restructure the development finance architecture in 
ways that can enhance coordination and synergies, maximise development finance 
impact, and catalyse private sector investment in fragile contexts.32
Given the complexities and risks of supporting pioneering investments in fragile 
settings and the diverse expertise and mandates of development finance actors, 
significant value will come through development finance players operating in a 
cohesive and coordinated manner, under a common strategy, and pursuing shared 
objectives. So far, this has not always been the case as, at times, their actions remain 
fragmented and in competition with one another. 
26 ODA grows to 11.5 times the value of FDI inflows and more than twice the value of 
remittances in extremely fragile contexts, according to OECD 2020.
27 OECD 2020, OECD 2018.
28 Ragoussis & Shams 2017, OECD 2020.
29 Jensen 2020.
30 Attridge et al. 2019, Cusack et al. 2020.
31 Attridge & Engen 2019, Kenny 2019, Lee & Sami 2019.
32 Savoy et al. 2016.
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3.2 The key role of DFIs
Certain actors will need to take a lead in shaping this changed mode of working. 
DFIs have been increasingly identified as the player that could increase collaboration 
between development finance actors. DFIs’ potential comparative advantage in 
leading private sector transformation in fragile settings hinges on the following 
elements:
 — An explicit private sector development focus, as opposed to the more 
humanitarian or public sector aims of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and MDBs.
 — Sizeable and growing balance sheets, reflecting shareholders’ vision for a 
greater role for DFIs in the global development agenda.
 — Capacity to invest and lend on favourable terms as they are able to take on 
higher risk and accept lower rates of return on public funds, justified by the 
significant social and economic benefits their investments have the potential 
to generate. The use of blended finance further expands DFIs’ risk-bearing 
capacity through crowding in private capital. 
 — Deep expertise, networks, and influence across public policy and private 
investment, and the ability to mobilise joint approaches.
Shareholders have also been vocal about DFIs assuming greater risks and 
maximising development impact.33 This is exemplified by the recent creation of 
the US$2.5 billion Private Sector Window by IFC and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) to mobilise private sector investment in International 
Development Association (IDA) countries, with a special focus on fragile and 
conflict-affected states.34
One of the greatest constraints to DFI investing in fragile contexts to date is a lack 
of competent, clean sponsors to manage firms and investments, as well as projects 
that do not pose reputational risks. DFIs have strict Integrity Due Diligence (IDD) 
rules governing who they can invest with, prohibiting transactions with those who 
are politically connected or have been involved in prior illegal activity – a particularly 
challenging threshold for fragile, conflict, and post-conflict settings. Supporting the 
establishment of new, large firms with the competence and clean track record needed 
to pass IDD muster will be an essential part of DFI work in fragile contexts.  
Similarly, ensuring that products are traceable and that there is no forced or child 
labour in the supply chain is essential, yet challenging, in undeveloped contexts. 
Additionally, the sometimes harsh scrutiny and negative media coverage that can be 
received from Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations 
can lower DFI shareholders’ willingness to take on difficult investments in fragile 
environments. 
To take on the leadership and coordinating role of championing pioneering 
investments in fragile contexts, DFIs will need to draw on their investment 
33 Ibid.
34 IDA 2016. IDA is the part of the World Bank that helps the world’s poorest 
countries by providing zero or low‑interest loans or grants for programmes that 
support economic development and poverty and inequality reduction.
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management expertise. Additionally, by better understanding the types of 
investment that can bring transformational impact in these settings and modifying 
their corporate incentives accordingly, DFIs can pivot their investment approach and 
facilitate a process of change across development finance stakeholders as a whole.
3.3 The types of investment that are most needed
Some types of investments offer particular value in fragile contexts. While it is 
generally not possible to meet all criteria, and some aspects may be in conflict 
with one another, certain core principles could usefully guide investment 
decision-making.
3.3.1 Focus on jobs, not deals 
Fragile settings are desperately short of productive jobs in the formal sector. This 
keeps firms from achieving economies of scale and specialisation and hampers 
countries from making progress towards structural transformation and escaping 
fragility. 
As providers of capital, DFIs are primarily suited to making capital-intensive 
rather than labour-intensive investments. However, there is still considerable scope 
for them to have a tangible impact on job creation. Indeed, development finance 
investments should be assessed based on their potential to generate decent, formal 
jobs that move people out of precarious, informal work – their value is even greater 
if they can catalyse job creation beyond the boundaries of a single deal. As such, 
job creation should be used as a metric of success that is measured and rewarded 
within DFIs, instead of defining success primarily in terms of number and size of 
individual deals.  
Understanding who benefits and who loses out from job creation is central to 
assessing the development impact of investments.35 Job creation that benefits those 
who would otherwise remain in poverty, particularly members of marginalised 
groups, and that achieves fair distribution of benefits along ethnic and regional 
lines has the greatest impact on development and stability.36 Beyond creating decent, 
formal sector jobs, investments that improve the quality of informal sector jobs are 
also critical.37
3.3.2 Raise productivity
Efforts to reduce poverty and raise standards of living require higher real wages, 
which is the outcome of more productive economies – however, investments that 
raise productivity may reduce labour requirements, leading less productive firms to 
shed jobs.38 How to weigh investments that create many, low-skilled jobs against 
those that significantly raise productivity but create fewer, higher-paying jobs is not 
straightforward. Furthermore, the spillover effects of these different investments 
35 Carter & Sedlacek 2019.
36 Ibid., Mayer et al. 2020.
37 Carter & Sedlacek 2019.
38 Ibid.
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on the broader economy cannot always be gauged easily. That said, productivity 
increases are essential for structural transformation and higher wages and 
investments that contribute to this should be recognised. 
3.3.3 Investments with transformative potential 
Catalytic investments are those that affect multiple ‘nodes’ of an economic network. 
They enable direct and indirect multipliers that ripple through the entire economy. 
As a consequence, the whole system re-arranges itself and thrives through imitation, 
knowledge transfer, capacity building, reduction in the price of intermediate inputs, 
and establishment of forward and backward linkages. A transformative investment 
improves the returns of subsequent investments and reduces intermediate costs of 
production.39
A critical feature of catalytic investments is that, rather than being an end in 
themselves, they enable the creation of clusters and webs of production through 
which economies of specialisation and agglomeration can be realised.40 Examples 
include investments in the transportation sector that reduce transportation costs 
across the economy, energy investments that unlock inclusive energy access, or the 
knowledge seeding that revolutionised the Bangladeshi garment industry (see Box 2).
Box 2: Catalysing an industry through pioneer seeding in the 
Bangladesh garment sector41
In the aftermath of its independence war of 1971, Bangladesh suffered 
from several symptoms of state fragility, including weak institutions, 
rife corruption, an underdeveloped private sector, poor enforcement of 
property rights, and widespread illiteracy. 
Bangladesh’s development has been primarily driven by the growth of 
the garment industry, which represents the principal source of foreign 
currency earnings and employment for the country. But this was not 
always the case: traditionally, the sector had comprised a handful 
of firms utilising rudimentary, low‑tech production techniques and 
struggling with low productivity, profits, and exports. 
The industry was enabled by what has been referred to as the 
knowledge seeding of a domestic pioneering firm, Desh Garments, 
by a foreign multinational, Korea’s Daewoo, in 1978. As part of a 
partnership, Daewoo took 130 Desh workers to Korea and trained them 
on assembly line manufacturing – a key step to scale up production and 
enhance quality – in exchange for a share of export revenue. Upon the 
workers’ return, Desh became the single largest factory in Bangladesh.
39 Carter 2019.
40 Collier 2007.
41 Mostafa & Klepper 2018.
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Over time, the development of the entire sector was galvanised through 
processes of imitation as well as transfer of tacit knowledge enabled by 
the mobility of former Desh workers, who were sought after and hired by 
a growing number of competitors. Broader contributing factors included 
favourable access to US and European markets, political support among 
senior Bangladeshi policymakers for industry growth, and the ability 
to make land available to support formation of production clusters in 
Dhaka and Chittagong.
Industry growth was exponential: the number of factories went from 300 
in 1980 to over 4,500 today, and exports soared and captured US and 
European markets. This example demonstrated how an industry pioneer 
can play a key role in catalysing development of an entire economy, 
even in contexts where traditional growth conditions, such as strong 
institutions and high literacy rates, are missing.
Investments with catalytic potential are few and far between, but where they exist, 
they should be seized. Requiring transformative potential for all investments is, 
however, too high a standard for fragile contexts – rather, it is a boon when these 
opportunities emerge.
3.3.4 Financing should be flexible, patient, and risk tolerant 
Conventional DFI financing models and tools tend to not be well suited for the 
needs of fragile settings. DFI ticket size requirements often approach US$ 20-30 
million, but it is unrealistic to insist on such large projects in fragile contexts, or 
for fragile economies to be capable of absorbing such large windfalls of finance. 
Viable opportunities in fragile contexts are found at lower thresholds, often below 
US$ 5 million. Rather than prioritising large-scale investments, DFIs could enable 
smaller, steady, long-term investment flows which are capable of withstanding 
volatility.42 This could be most effectively operationalised by DFIs working through 
local intermediaries – an approach that could bring down overhead costs, build out 
domestic financial sectors, and leverage local intermediaries’ superior contextual 
knowledge. 
Investment strategies in fragile settings also need to allow for greater risk tolerance 
through increased equity participation, which may be particularly additional in 
fragile contexts where early-stage equity markets are severely underdeveloped. 
Despite this need, loans currently make up over 70% of DFI commitments globally, 
with peaks in excess of 90% in certain institutions. Equity, on the other hand, 
generally remains below 30% of portfolios and is concentrated in higher income, 
typically less fragile countries (see Figure 1).43 The proportion of debt operations in 
fragile settings is likely much higher than the global average.
42 CDC Group 2019.
43 Lee & Sami 2019, Kenny 2019. Notable exceptions include CDC Group and, to a 
lesser extent, DEG.
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Figure 1: DFI investment portfolio by financial instrument (%)44
Institutional risk aversion is one of the factors that drives an over-reliance on 
loans and quasi-loans because debt ensures greater certainty of returns and better 
protection of investors in the event of bankruptcy. Equity, on the other hand, carries 
greater reputational and financial risks since investors become legal shareholders of 
the firms. This can be problematic where local firms do not pass DFIs’ IDD muster. 
Local firm owners may also resist equity investments – they may not want to dilute 
their shareholdings, be exposed to close scrutiny, or may be family-owned businesses 
not open to bringing in external shareholders. 
Moreover, equity investments generally require an on-the-ground presence and 
deep local knowledge to be successful, which can increase overhead costs of these 
investments for DFIs. Additionally, the illiquidity of equity will, over time, also limit 
DFI capacity to make new investments as funds can be tied up in equity portfolios 
for many years, whereas debt liquidates over a shorter horizon and frees up funding 
for new investments. A balance between debt and equity is therefore needed, but 
equity is undoubtedly under-represented in DFI portfolios in fragile settings. 
Although managing firms themselves in fragile contexts is not necessarily DFIs’ 
value add, equity does carry a number of favourable characteristics in fragile 
settings that cannot be promoted by debt:
 — Risk absorption and stability – Equity investments do not place immediate 
requirements on the company to generate returns and repay investors. This allows 
firms to take a longer-term approach to investment and pursue higher growth 
strategies. Equity investments also offer greater stability than debt to the firm 
since, during temporarily volatile times, shareholders can only “run” by selling 
their shares – a difficult task in fragile markets, especially during bad times.45
44 Center for Global Development 2020. The DFI Dashboard captures data for nine 
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 — Signalling effect and leverage – DFIs assuming equity positions sends 
risk-reducing signals to potential investors, grounded in DFIs’ reputation in 
areas of due diligence, project screening, and technical skills. In turn, strong 
positive signals can boost leverage ratios, catalyse new firms to the market, 
and improve development impact.
 — Comparative advantage – MDBs’ knowledge of countries’ macroeconomic 
conditions, economic dynamics, and on-the-ground presence are critical in 
equity operations and may confer on some DFIs an important comparative 
advantage in this investment class compared to other actors.46
 — Hands-on management – Equity allows for better control of management 
decisions. This is especially relevant in fragile contexts where deals 
might require a more hands-on approach than in conventional settings. 
Theoretically, DFIs may therefore become involved in a diverse and 
unconventional range of activities, from business development to recruitment, 
maintenance, social infrastructure development, or regulatory reform.47 
Taking on such responsibilities, however, exposes DFIs to heightened 
operational and reputational risks in these challenging environments. DFIs 
are also not necessarily set up to handle this level of hands-on management, 
which, furthermore, constrains their capacity to support more investments. 
3.3.5 Investment strategies should adopt conflict sensitive approaches 
Although there is a growing interest in policy circles about the role that private 
investment could play in promoting peace and mitigating conflict, to date we lack 
conclusive empirical evidence on the causal relationship between business and peace. 
What is clear, however, is that business as usual in settings affected by fragility and 
conflict does not always yield peace-positive outcomes; indeed, it often fuels new 
grievances or exacerbates tensions.
The negative impact of private sector operations on fragility is often the result of 
large inflows of resources into highly resource-scarce environments, with local 
actors vying for control of these resources. In contexts characterised by weak 
institutions and high levels of corruption, tensions can result from corporate taxes 
and royalties paid by firms to the government being appropriated by elite groups 
or diverted towards other parts of the country instead of being used toward socio-
economic investments that benefit local communities affected by investments. The 
lack of effective legal frameworks also deprives local communities of ways to obtain 
government protection from the negative impacts of business operations, such as 
pollution or forced resettlement. In some cases, firms may even benefit from the 
continuation of conflict and take deliberate actions that undermine peace.48 A case 
in point is that of Sierra Leone, where businessmen were deeply implicated in the 
country’s civil war, supporting opposing factions for personal gain.49
In fragile contexts, it is vital that DFIs and others adopt conflict sensitive approaches 
that take into account the contextual and complex reality surrounding an investment, 
46 Lee & Sami 2019.
47 CDC Group 2019.
48 Mayer et al. 2020.
49 Ganson & M’cleod 2018.
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“Conflict sensitivity 
is key to DFIs’ dual 
mandate of furthering 
private sector 
development and social 
and economic gains.”
Photo credit: Asanka Brendon Ratnayake
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as well as the interactions that the investment has with the wider environment. Conflict 
sensitivity also involves adopting measures that proactively mitigate against negative 
impacts caused by private sector activity and that promote peace efforts. 
In their conflict sensitivity approaches, DFIs should steer away from one-size-fits-
all, magic bullet thinking, and instead recognise the complexities of the issues 
at hand. Strategies should be tailored to the type and size of businesses, as the 
sector and scale of operation have different implications for local dynamics. For 
example, a mining investment can result in environmental destruction that impacts 
local communities and fuels anger, triggering greater tensions than establishing 
manufacturing operations may.50 
DFI conflict sensitive strategies should also involve:
 — An explicit recognition that private sector investments inevitably interact 
with complex, political dynamics and that DFIs bear the responsibility of 
carefully designing and managing projects, particularly those that have the 
potential to trigger or worsen tensions and conflicts.
 — Strategies that account for the evolving nature of the conflict cycle, 
recognising that an investment project might not be successful in some 
conflict stages, but at other times may support political transitions through 
mitigating tensions and promoting stability. 
 — Sector and project-specific analyses, such as fragility assessments and 
political economy analyses, detailing the potential risks and impacts an 
investment poses to fragility and conflict, and offering recommendations on 
how to address these dynamics.
 — Intentional, pre-determined interventions to manage DFI impacts on 
fragility and conflict. For instance, infrastructure projects would need to 
include consultations with affected communities and appropriate resettlement 
plans, if relevant. The potential for investment projects to exacerbate existing 
ethnic and regional inequalities should be borne in mind and, to the extent 
feasible, attempts made to spatially distribute investments.
 — Development and adoption of conflict sensitivity metrics to track impacts 
throughout the investment cycle. Metrics could aim to capture information 
on aspects such as the degree of societal agreement with the use of land and 
natural resources, the effectiveness of conflict prevention efforts, and the 
extent of positive impact on the informal sector.51 These aspects are, however, 
not easy to capture and investees would need to be supported in this exercise. 
 — Since conflict sensitivity is a relatively new area of practice for DFIs, 
inter-institutional collaboration should be prioritised, with an emphasis 
on lesson sharing, joint piloting, and standardisation of requirements and 
practices. Recent evidence suggests that peace-positive impacts are more likely 
when investments involve partnerships with other firms and stakeholders, 
including civil society and government agencies.52
50 Mayer et al. 2020.
51 Ganson & M’cleod 2018.
52 Mayer et al. 2020.
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Conflict resilience is also frequently a factor in DFI decision-making – for example, 
it’s less risky to invest in firms that are able to continue functioning during upticks in 
conflict, such as firms in the services sector.
While DFIs are yet to fully and formally operationalise these principles, recent 
initiatives by the European Investment Bank and the IFC seem promising in this 
regard (see Box 3).
Box 3. Conflict sensitivity initiatives by DFIs53
The European Investment Bank (EIB) developed conflict-sensitive 
guidelines for projects in fragile settings in 2015. In 2017, it launched the 
Conflict Sensitivity Helpdesk to provide staff in headquarters and country 
offices with project‑specific support on due diligence mechanisms and 
conflict sensitive approaches throughout the conflict cycle.
IFC’s Conflict-Affected States in Africa (CASA) programme has 
been adopting a fragility lens in its advisory services to early‑stage 
projects since 2015. This approach is based on an assessment of the 
political risks associated with an investment and careful analysis of 
the fragility‑inducing impacts that it could provoke. The fragility lens is 
operationalised by ensuring that at each stage of the project cycle the 
following questions must be addressed: 
• What is the conflict context in which the project operates? 
• What is the two‑way interaction between the project and its 
context? 
• What are the best ways for the project to minimise its negative 
effects on conflict and maximise its positive impacts?
3.3.7 Additionality should underpin investment decisions
Development finance investments in fragile settings and elsewhere should not substitute 
or displace private finance. Such an approach would run against DFI aims to mitigate 
market failures, support the development of private sector ecosystems, promote 
competition, and crowd-in private capital. Rather, development finance investments 
should be additional: they should enable and facilitate investments which would not 
have gone ahead had there not been such external, non-commercial support. 
Financial additionality, which involves providing finance at more favourable terms 
than what the market is able to provide, is not always considered sufficient to justify 
DFI intervention as it could generate market distortions through the provision of 
excessive and unfair subsidies to investees without any assurance of development 
53 IFC 2018a.
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impacts.54 Factoring in development additionality is a useful consideration.55 
This aims to ensure that DFI support is conditional upon investee firms realising 
desirable social and economic impacts that commercial financiers are often not 
motivated to pursue. 
While DFIs may be required to prove additionality, the lack of real-world 
counterfactuals may make this assessment difficult.56 Demonstrating additionality, 
or at least improving the odds of additionality, could be done by analysing the 
circumstantial evidence of local market conditions that are more likely to manifest 
in the presence of an additional investment.57
In any event, given such low levels of investment in most fragile contexts, the 
majority of DFI investments would easily demonstrate both financial and 
development additionality, reinforcing the case for DFIs to focus on fragile settings 
rather than more developed economies. 
3.4 The challenges DFIs face in fragile settings
Despite there being an important role for DFIs in fragile contexts, they still face 
significant barriers to operating and investing in these settings or assuming a 
coordinating role within the development finance arena. 
3.4.1 Contextual challenges
Macro-level constraints of fragile contexts, such as political and economic 
instability, infrastructural deficiencies, weak human capital, and low state capacity 
limit the supply of investable opportunities, increase project costs, and threaten 
the viability of investments. In addition, there is a lack of established firms that 
could form networks with suppliers and buyers on which projects rely or serve as 
comparison cases for business and corporate strategy decisions. This is worsened 
by a broader scarcity of information on the local market, its risks (both actual and 
perceived), and the costs of operating in that environment.
3.4.2 Shareholder challenges
Shareholders have increasingly called for a bolder role for DFIs in fragile contexts, 
but many still expect DFI investments to meet rigid investment requirements. DFIs 
are often required to maintain AAA credit ratings, invest at commercial terms, 
avoid losses, and promptly meet ambitious environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) standards. These criteria tend to apply with the same stringency across global 
investment portfolios, rather than being tailored to different contexts. This limits 
DFIs’ ability to pursue potentially high-impact investments in fragile settings where 
risk is systematically higher, financial losses nearly inevitable, returns can take years 
to materialise, and ticket sizes tend to be small. 
54 Carter et al. 2018.
55 Ibid., Attridge & Engen 2019.
56 Carter et al. 2018.
57 Kenny & Moss 2020.
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3.4.3 Internal challenges 
DFIs face internal barriers stemming from their corporate culture and traditional 
ways of working that tend to endorse risk aversion and focus incentives mainly 
on deal making. To the extent that DFI staff are rewarded primarily for successful 
dealmaking, this may encourage effort towards easier, often higher-income, 
environments at the expense of fragile settings, which contributes to the trends seen 
in Figure 2. Project failure also continues to be stigmatised, rather than broadly 
accepted, despite failure being more likely in fragile environments. Indeed, a lack 
of failure is likely a clear indication that DFIs are not venturing into the difficult 
environments where their ability to facilitate private sector entry is vital. Finally, 
teams in fragile contexts often suffer from limited resources and fewer senior staff 
on the ground compared to teams in less fragile settings.
Figure 2: DFI investment by country income (%)58 
3.4.4 Reputational concerns 
Investing in fragile settings exposes DFIs to greater reputational risks than in non-
fragile environments because of the complex local conditions, weak logistics and 
supply chain networks, and challenging social, economic, and political dynamics 
that make meeting IDD and ESG requirements challenging.59
Realism is needed in very difficult settings – without this, investments will not 
be made and there will be no progress toward creating much-needed economic 
opportunities in these contexts. A more viable approach could be to agree on a 
timeline for investments to progressively come into compliance with ESG, labour, 
and other regulatory requirements – with strong accountability measures kicking in 
should milestones be missed. 
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4 Policy considerations for improving 
development finance in fragile settings
Efforts to kickstart private sector development in fragile settings have made limited 
progress to date, necessitating rethinking of past approaches. Here, we detail policy 
considerations that development finance actors could bear in mind when investing in 
fragile contexts.
4.1 Renew DFI institutional culture
DFIs’ approach in fragile environments has often been compared to that of 
commercial investors due to a high reliance on debt for a limited number of projects 
and a prioritisation of financial returns. This cautious approach keeps DFIs from 
playing a more transformative role in fragile settings as, in an effort to ensure project 
success, they may fail to assume those risks that pioneering firms cannot bear alone. 
DFIs’ risk aversion stems partly from institutional culture and corporate practices, 
which can be transformed to align with two principles:
 — Define success in terms of jobs created, not deals – Defining and rewarding 
DFI staff success primarily on the basis of number of transactions and size 
of deals disincentivises efforts in fragile situations where ticket sizes are 
smaller and it takes more time and resources to conclude deals. Generating 
decent jobs at scale, or contributing to productivity increases, should be 
accepted as metrics of success to be similarly measured and rewarded. A more 
comprehensive score card approach has already been adopted by some DFIs. 
 — Accept failure – The likelihood of failure is high given the complex challenges 
and risks that fragile environments present. DFIs should accept the non-trivial 
probability of failure and proceed in these contexts with a high risk tolerance, 
as the transformational role they can play is only possible if they take on 
risks. Where DFIs should draw the line with risks is not straightforward, 
however, as investments that lose them money limit their scope for future 
investments, so recklessness is similarly problematic. Nonetheless, failure, 
especially if resulting from innovation and experimentation, should be seen 
as an opportunity to learn and build up knowledge on highly uncertain 
environments. Institutional processes should be developed so that such 
knowledge is internalised by and shared among investment officers, who are 
then better equipped to pursue other projects in fragile settings.60
Beyond these considerations, it may be necessary for some DFIs to adjust in order 
to make themselves fit-for-purpose for operating in fragile contexts. They may not 
currently have the mandate, expertise, or in-country presence needed to take on 
challenging investments with the potential to make transformational contributions 
in fragile settings. 
60 Collier et al. 2019.
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4.2 Strengthen inter-institutional collaboration
Development finance players have different yet complementary mandates, 
specialisations, and focus areas. This has often led them to act in an uncoordinated, 
siloed, and somewhat competitive manner. While some competition can promote 
discipline and innovation, excess competition is wasteful and counterproductive. 
This is especially true in fragile contexts, where the benefits of collaboration far 
outweigh those of competition. Greater collaboration enables the sharing of 
information and spreading of risks and costs, which ultimately improves the chances 
of project success. There are two key levels of collaboration that need to be scaled 
up: inter-DFI collaboration and DFI-aid agency collaboration.
4.2.1 Inter‑DFI collaboration  
To lower the risks and costs associated with working in fragile contexts, a 
collaborative approach to investment, based on pooling resources across DFIs, could 
help overcome barriers and increase the chances of success. Collaboration is also 
conducive to facilitating the entry of multiple firms into a fragile context, which 
is relevant as firms are more likely to enter these settings if they do not go alone. 
Guided by a common purpose, multiple DFIs operating in a given sector can identify 
and attract firms from their home countries that could be supported to enter these 
markets. Acting in concert and with a shared voice also strengthens DFIs’ dialogue 
with governments, making it more likely that DFIs can push for necessary reforms.  
To the extent possible, co-financing efforts should be institutionalised through 
formal structures such as special purpose vehicles (SPVs): 
 — Special purpose vehicles – SPVs managed by multiple development finance 
stakeholders would consist of joint funds with equity participation which 
should focus on development impact, mobilisation of private finance, market 
creation, improving the enabling environment, and tackling drivers of 
fragility. It would operate in the country of investment and DFI staff would be 
seconded to the SPV and would work for the SPV’s mandate rather than that 
of the DFI. 
Lying outside the financiers’ own balance sheets, the SPV arrangement has 
the benefit of having less of an impact on institutional credit ratings. Plus, 
being a separate entity could enable the SPV to take on greater risk at arms’ 
length from DFIs. This type of facility should provide risk-absorbing tools, 
such as local currency investments, junior debt, guarantees, and a greater use 
of equity. Prudential management would be ensured through realistic financial 
requirements such as capital preservation, rather than unviable thresholds for 
risk-adjusted commercial returns for investment viability.61
The creation of an SPV does not come without challenges and transaction 
costs, however, especially concerning the varying interests and objectives 
of both the financiers and the users of the fund, mainly DFIs. Significant 
resources must be allocated to coordination, fund strategy, transparency 
disclosure, and harmonisation of practices and standards. Options such as 
thematic SPVs that can accommodate the specific interests and risk appetites 
of different DFIs in a particular fragile setting should be explored.
61 Ibid.
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Additional forms of collaboration that should be pursued include: 
 — Co-financing of upstream work – Investing in fragile contexts demands 
considerable preparatory work to develop project pipelines, including 
risk assessments, technical assistance, training, and the regulatory and 
institutional development needed for a conducive enabling environment. 
Another critical area is supporting the establishment of large domestic firms, 
who can then serve as the capable and clean sponsors that are so scarce and 
otherwise constrain DFIs from investing in fragile contexts. Few DFIs are 
currently set up to support the establishment of local firms. 
The time and expense involved in upstream activities can be considerable. 
Since upstream work can benefit multiple projects across different sectors 
and because it needs to leverage diverse skills, it represents a key area for 
collaboration as a tool to reduce costs and improve impact. DFI joint efforts 
would likely entail a wide range of early-stage upstream work that scopes 
whole-sector or whole-market opportunities, rather than individual deals, 
accommodating varying interests and objectives of DFIs.
 — Harmonisation of practices and standards – Developing common policies 
and practices in fragile contexts can contribute to reduced overhead costs 
and would facilitate co-financing frameworks. Harmonised approaches could 
involve the adoption of shared ESG standards or reporting and diagnostic 
tools that can be replicated across settings and shared across institutions.
 — Joint data production – Scarcity of comparable information about the local 
markets and investment performance raises uncertainty and investors’ search 
costs and risks, and thus hinders investment. DFI joint efforts to collect and 
share comparable data through a common platform represents a practical 
solution for these challenges. 
4.2.2 DFI‑aid agency collaboration  
The public good potential of investments in fragile contexts warrants the use of 
aid funding to make them possible. Many investments, even those with catalytic 
potential, such as scaling energy or connectivity infrastructure, are simply not 
financially viable for the private sector to take on unassisted in fragile settings. High 
returns can only be realised through elevated service costs that those living in fragile 
states cannot afford. Aid funding, in the form of de-risked loans or outright grants, 
is able to accept lower rates of return and therefore has a critical role to play in 
making these investments possible. 
Coordinating infrastructure development to meet the needs of specific sectors that 
are being built out and pioneering firms that are being attracted into these markets 
requires close coordination between aid agencies and DFIs. Coordination should 
extend beyond single investments and should support dialogue on private sector 
development between DFIs, aid agencies, and government. 
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4.3 Coordinate with government and civil society
A constructive dialogue with government officials should be undertaken early on in 
project consideration and serve as a tool to scope out sector potential. On the basis 
of these discussions, development finance actors should develop sector strategies 
for their efforts that are aligned with government plans. DFIs should also commit 
to working with governments, rather than around them, even where government 
capacity is very limited in fragile states, to ensure that sponsored projects have 
government buy-in. 
NGOs and civil society groups also have a key role to play in private sector 
development in fragile contexts. Strengthening ties with these groups and developing 
collaborative relationships is an important tool for shared learning and better 
understanding of respective aims, efforts, and challenges. Oversight and guidance 
from NGOs and civil society could help ensure that private sector development does 
not aggravate tensions or conflict through skewed benefit distribution and could 
also mitigate reputational risks by allowing development finance actors to be more 
informed of social and political developments that may impact investments.
4.4 Invest in financial intermediaries
Small ticket size is a key constraint to increasing DFI investments in fragile contexts, 
due to overheads comprising a disproportionately high share of costs. Investing 
in local financial intermediaries, such as local banks for debt and venture capital 
funds for equity, is an effective way to reach SMEs with DFI and aid financing. These 
investments provide support to the local financial sector, enabling its development 
over time. Investment in financial intermediaries appears to be especially additional 
in fragile settings as it targets the “missing middle” between commercial finance 
and microfinance, and increases competition in financial markets that are often 
controlled by few firms. DFIs are also able to benefit from the deep local market 
knowledge that local financial intermediaries possess.62
Local banks and venture capital firms have limited capacity in fragile contexts. This 
is particularly true for venture capital firms, which are very rare in fragile settings. 
DFIs will have to undertake upstream work to build competent local banks and 
attract venture capital fund managers to strengthen financial intermediary capability 
in fragile settings. A good example of a DFI doing this is IFC’s SME Ventures 
initiative, which provides finance with a higher risk tolerance than bank loans 
(in the form of equity, loans, and quasi-loans) and targeted technical assistance 
to entrepreneurs and fund managers as they work to establish themselves in 
challenging markets.63
4.5 Leverage innovative financing tools
The exceptional challenges presented by fragile environments require innovative 
approaches to tackle them. Policies copied from elsewhere and business as usual 
approaches will not work in fragile contexts. The pervasive radical uncertainty of 
these settings means that discovering what works will only result from sustained, 
iterative experimentation and active inter-institutional learning and lesson–sharing. 
62 Carter 2020, IFC 2019.
63 IFC 2018b.
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Experimentation and innovation should cover the tools and mechanisms of 
collaborative financing frameworks and develop new products that enable DFIs 
to assume greater risks in fragile environments and to incrementally strengthen 
financing mechanisms through application. 
4.5.1 Blended finance 
Blended finance is a co-financing strategy which involves combining concessional 
finance from aid budgets with commercial finance from DFIs and the private sector. 
It has been gaining traction as a tool to maximise the mobilisation of private capital 
to achieve philanthropic objectives such as the SDGs.64 In fragile contexts, blended 
finance can be a powerful de-risking tool. Combining DFI resources with subsidised 
capital helps to lower the investment risk in fragile contexts and crowd-in private 
capital. It also represents a practical avenue to operationalise collaboration across 
diverse stakeholders to pursue the twin goals of private sector growth and socio-
economic development. 
So far, mobilisation ratios from the deployment of blended finance in low-income 
countries has been weak in terms of project size and geographic and sectoral 
focus.65 Moreover, blended finance tends to have higher transaction costs than other 
DFI investments as it involves additional layers of negotiation and collaboration 
between DFIs and aid agencies. Little information on blended finance investment 
performance has also been cited as an impediment to it being scaled up.66 While 
blended finance has the potential to reduce risks and costs associated with 
establishing new markets, thereby mobilising private finance for fragile contexts, 
measures must be taken to improve its effectiveness. Examples include:
 — Increasing capacity – Blended finance still constitutes a minor portion of 
total DFI investments and some suggest that creating additional lending 
headroom would be viable.67 Greater capacity alone might simply reinforce 
current trends, however, with no factual shift of capital towards low-income 
countries or fragile contexts – therefore, more fundamental strategic changes 
may be required.
 — Invest in private sector fundamentals – Arguably, high market risk 
drives away blended finance from fragile contexts. Substantial and holistic 
investments in strengthening enabling environments are needed to lower risk 
perception and enable local private sector actors to function more effectively. 
 — Coordination – Improved coordination among DFIs and donors, especially 
through shared and standardised investment approaches, could lower 
overhead costs and increase DFIs’ access to blended finance.
 — Transparency – Making information on blended finance investments available 
is a critical factor to fostering cross-institutional learning, shareholder 
confidence, and, thus, mobilising additional resources.
64 AfDB et al. 2019.
65 Attridge & Engen 2019.
66 AfDB & Convergence 2017.
67 AfDB et al. 2017, AfDB et al. 2018, AfDB et al. 2019.
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 — Shareholder management – Educating shareholders about the potential 
impact that blended finance could have on driving development in fragile 
settings is critical, as is raising awareness of the role that imposed risk-return 
thresholds may be playing in holding DFIs back. 
4.5.2 Social impact bonds  
Although definitions of social impact vary, a social impact bond or ‘pay for success’ 
agreement is “a public-private partnership financial instrument in which investors 
pay for a set of interventions to improve a social outcome that is of social and/
or financial interest to the commissioner, usually or traditionally a government. In 
other words, the government pays private investors a return for funding successful 
social projects that meet measurable outcomes.”68
These could be tailored for fragile contexts and used to de-risk or aggregate 
investments into fragile states for the purpose of creating jobs and consolidating 
peace.69 The commissioner could either be an international organisation or 
development agency (rather than a government) or a special entity formed by DFIs 
and/or aid agencies to guarantee payment of returns to investors in the event that 
the government of the fragile state is unable to pay.70 To overcome the issue of small 
loans sizes and high overhead costs of structuring and implementing social bonds, 
many small loans to fragile states could be aggregated to increase bond size. 
4.5.3 Political risk insurance  
Political risk, arising from war, asset expropriation, contractual breach, or 
prohibitions on exports, is an important deterrent of investment in fragile 
settings. Political risk insurance is a tool that protects against investment losses 
that may result from these events. However, in fragile contexts it remains limited 
or prohibitively expensive and is often available only to foreign investors. Efforts 
to scale up political risk insurance to make it more affordable as well as available 
to local investors could be valuable in catalysing greater investment into fragile 
markets. Multilateral institutions, such as MIGA, are best placed to drive this as 
they can assume greater risk than private insurers, offer longer tenure of coverage 
and lower, more constant premiums, and can use their institutional influence to 
mitigate disputes between government and investors.71
4.5.3 Currency management instruments  
DFIs and foreign investors have hard currency balance sheets, exposing them to 
currency risk, particularly in fragile states where macroeconomic instability is 
common. Sectors that earn foreign currency through exports, such as extractives 
and agri-business, are slightly less risky. 
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To finance more firms in fragile contexts, currency risk needs to be addressed. This 
can be done through currency management instruments, such as the IFC’s Local 
Currency Facility, which provides long-term local currency in IDA countries where 
market solutions are not available or capital markets are not sufficiently developed.72 
This facility provides protection to clients operating in contexts where currency 
hedging options are limited or absent.73 As with political risk insurance, ensuring 
that currency management instruments are affordably priced for fragile contexts 
and made available to both domestic and foreign investors is central to scaling up its 
usage among investors. 
72 IDA n.d.
73 Ibid.
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6 Conclusion
Pioneering firms and investments can serve a catalytic role in challenging contexts 
through establishing new markets, training labour, creating jobs and income-
generating opportunities, developing supply chains, and supporting governments 
to improve the country’s broader enabling environment for private sector growth. 
But these firms cannot take on this task alone – nor should they be required to. The 
higher risks and costs they incur have the potential to generate public goods that 
benefit others. It is essential that mechanisms to offset the additional costs they 
incur are available. 
Development finance can play a vital role in this. Although development finance 
alone is not sufficient to drive private sector growth, it can be deployed strategically 
to de-risk early investments and crowd-in private investors, whose financial 
resources are considerably larger than aid volumes. DFIs are well placed to lead this 
early investment process through proactive coordination, collaboration, risk-taking, 
inter-institutional learning, and innovation. Through leveraging different sources of 
financing and driving the upstream work needed to develop project pipelines, DFIs 
can play a central role in igniting private sector growth, which is critical to moving 
fragile contexts out of cycles of low-productivity, unemployment, and fragility 
toward more positive development tracks. 
For DFIs to successfully fulfil this role will necessitate some changes in the way 
they work. First, their institutional culture and corporate practices could better 
align staff incentives with development impact outcomes, such as job creation and 
raising firm productivity, rather than focusing primarily on the number and value 
of investments made. DFIs will also need to become more comfortable with failure, 
given it’s significantly higher likelihood in fragile contexts. 
Increased collaboration with other DFIs and aid agencies is essential to achieving 
coordinated, complementary efforts that could also spread risks and costs across 
institutions. This collaboration can take many forms, including pooling funds to co-
finance upstream work, harmonising practices and standards, jointly producing and 
sharing data, and coordinating investment projects while attracting investors into 
particular sectors.
Although government capacity in fragile settings is often extremely limited, it’s vital 
that DFIs work with governments rather than around them. Government should 
have buy-in to investment projects, and projects should align with government 
priorities. NGOs and broader civil society in fragile contexts are important partners 
for DFIs: among other things, they can provide valuable oversight and guidance to 
ensure that investments do not aggravate tensions or conflict. 
Working through local financial intermediaries – local banks for debt and venture 
capital firms for equity – would enable DFIs to reach SMEs and support smaller 
ticket sizes while minimising overheads, strengthening local financial markets, 
and leveraging the deep local market knowledge that local financial 
intermediaries possess. 
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A number of innovative financing tools can be used to boost investments in fragile 
contexts, including blended finance that uses public funding as a powerful de-
risking tool to crowd-in private capital. Social impact bonds that allow investors to 
pay for defined interventions to improve social outcomes could also be tailored for 
fragile contexts. Political risk insurance, currency management instruments, and 
other tools to support investments could be significantly scaled up through more 
affordable pricing for fragile contexts and extending eligibility to domestic as well as 
foreign investors. 
Job creation and private sector development have considerable potential to support 
countries moving out of poverty and fragility, warranting the use of public funding 
for these purposes. However, the positive, public good nature of these developments 
is not guaranteed. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, private sector activities 
just as often aggravate ethnic and regional inequalities and perpetuate conflict. If 
the distribution of benefits of economic growth are unequal and contested, private 
sector development may deepen societal divides. To guard against the negative 
impacts of private sector development in these contexts, careful regulation of the 
private sector, context-specific strategies, and comprehensive approaches to 
conflict sensitivity are needed 
Financing private sector growth in fragile, conflict-affected, and post-conflict 
settings is not straightforward and requires leveraging finance across both the public 
and private sectors. Achieving the SDGs and global socio-economic prosperity 
will not be possible until millions of people living in settings of conflict and 
fragility are able to access the economic opportunities and improved public services 
needed to progressively lift them out of poverty and instability. Peace and stability 
have priceless domestic benefits, but also significant regional and global gains – 
supporting these environments in transitioning out of fragility is undoubtedly a 
global good and an urgent priority.
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